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Abstract: We consider a population of identical individuals preying on an exhaustible
resource. The individuals in the population choose a strategy that defines how they use their
available time over the course of their life for feeding, for reproducing (say laying eggs), or
split their energy in between these two activities. We here suppose that their life lasts a full
season, so that the chosen strategy results in the production of a certain number of eggs laid
over the season. This number then helps define the long-run evolution of the population
since the eggs constitute the basis for the population for the next season. However, in this
paper, we strictly concentrate on what occurs within a season, by considering two possible
strategies: the collective optimum and the uninvadable strategy.
The (collective) optimal strategy involves a singular arc, which has some resource saving
feature and may, on the long-term, lead to an equilibrium. However, it is susceptible to
invasion by a greedy mutant which free-rides on this resource saving strategy. Therefore,
the “optimal” strategy is not evolutionarily stable.
We thus look for an evolutionarily stable strategy, using the first ESS condition (“Nash-
Wardrop condition”). This yields a different singular arc and a strategy that conserves less
the resource. Unfortunately, we show in a forthcoming paper that, though it is an ESS, it
is not long-term (interseasonal) sustainable. This is an instance of the classical “tragedy of
the commons”. In this paper we also investigate whether the mixed strategy on the singular
arcs may be interpreted in terms of population shares using pure strategies. The answer is
negative.
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Stabilité évolutionnaire des stratégies d’histoires de vies
de consommateurs solidaires confrontés à une invasion de
mutants
Résumé : Nous considérons une population d’individus identiques s’attaquant à une
ressource épuisable. Les individus de la population doivent choisir une stratégie qui définit
comment ils utilisent leur temps disponible au cours de leur vie à se nourrir, pour la re-
production (par exemple la ponte), ou en partageant leur énergie entre ces deux activités.
Nous supposons ici que leur vie ne dure qu’une saison complète, de sorte que la stratégie
choisie se traduit par la production d’un certain nombre d’oeufs pondus au cours de la sai-
son. Ce nombre permet alors de définir l’évolution à long terme de la population car les
oeufs constituent la base de la population pour la saison suivante. Dans ce rapport, nous
nous concentrons strictement sur ce qui se produit au sein d’une saison en considérant deux
stratégies possibles: l’optimum collectif et la stratégie non invasible.
La stratégie (collective) optimale définit un arc singulier le long duquel la ressource est
économisée; sur le long terme, cette stratégie peut conduire à un équilibre. Par contre, cettre
stratégie rend la population sensible à l’invasion par un mutant glouton qui n’économiserait
pas la ressource sur l’arc singulier. Par conséquent, la stratégie “optimale” n’est pas évolu-
tionnairement stable.
Nous allons donc rechercher une stratégie évolutionnairement stable, en utilisant la pre-
mière condition d’ESS (“condition de Nash-Wardrop”). Il en résulte un autre arc singulier
et une stratégie qui préserve moins la ressource.
Dans cet article, nous vérifions aussi si une stratégie mixte sur un arc singulier peut
être interprétée comme une représentation d’une population dont une partie se reproduit
continuellement et l’autre se nourrit. La réponse est négative: la stratégie mixte ne peut
représenter des parts de populations jouant des stratégies pures.
Mots-clés : Jeux différentiels, Dynamique des populations, Modèle consommateur-
ressource, ESS
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context and contribution
1.2 Context and contribution
The evolution of life history traits, e.g. the reproduction strategy an organism should follow
during the course of its life, is an important topic of evolutionary ecology [8, 16]. In this
respect, seminal contributions based on optimal control theory principles have focused on
the optimal energy allocation schedules of organisms into growth or reproduction (see the
reviews [15, 6, 7]). These studies consider an “energy allocation” trait, the proportion of
energy an organism invests at a given Â moment of its life into somatic growth or into re-
production forms, and look for dynamic (age and state dependent) strategies that maximize
the reproductive output of the organism. They show in particular how different growth-
reproduction dynamical strategies, like the determinate and indeterminate growth patterns,
may emerge from different hypotheses on the biology of the organisms ([15, 6]). These stud-
ies are however based on models at the individual level, and thus do not address population
issues and the potential feedbacks of population densities on the life history strategies that
should be promoted by evolution.
The eventual success of a strategy does however not necessarily depend on its optimal
exploitation of their ressource: a species indeed participates in games with other species and
mutants of its own which could take advantage of its “optimal” strategy; evolutionary game
theory is then the general framework for the study of which strategy is selected through
evolution. In that framework, the Adaptive Dynamics approach Â is a recent methodology
specifically tailored to tackle evolutionary questions arising in a population context [5, 3].
Based on the (un)-invasibility analysis of rare mutants into a resident population at eco-
logical equilibrium, the studies adopting this framework have mostly concentrated on scalar
or multi-dimensional traits. As such, they fairly overlooked potential dynamical life his-
tory traits which are by essence of an infinite-dimensional nature (see however [4] for an
exception).
In this contribution, we shall build on the model proposed by [1] to describe the Â in-
teractions between populations of seasonal species of consumers and resource organisms.
This model is of a semi-dicrete type [9]: the intra-seasonal interactions between the mature
consumers and resource populations as well as production of immature forms are modelled
with a continuous time system, while the inter-seasonal demographic processes, essentially
maturation of the immature forms and death of the mature populations, are modelled with
a discrete mapping. As such, this model allows to account for dynamical strategies (e.g.
feeding or reproduction of the consumers) at the intra-seasonal level, as well as their conse-
quences on populations at the long term scale through the investigation of the inter-seasonal
dynamics. More precisely, [1] studied the optimal feeding-reproduction strategy of the con-
sumer population; it can be looked at as an extension of the works on optimal energy
allocation described above to an explicit populational context. The current consensus is
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however that evolutionary studies should rely on invasibility criteria (as the Adaptive Dy-
namics methodology does) rather than on optimization criteria [13, 12].
The objective of the present contribution is to extend the work of [1] to investigate “un-
invadable” dynamic strategies, i.e. strategies that can not be beaten by alternative strategies
followed by some mutants taking advantage of their small density. In particular, we show
that the optimal cooperating strategy of the consumers computed in [1] can be invaded
(see also [2] for a deeper study of this issue), and that consumers may adopt an alternative
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) which prevents any mutant invasion. Though it will
not be developed in the present paper which concentrates on within season strategies, we
can show that, contrarily to the “cooperative” or “optimal” strategy that can lead to a long
term co-existence of resource and consumer populations, the ESS strategy always leads to
an evolutionary suicide of the consumers in the interseasonal dynamics.
1.3 The model
We consider an homogeneous population of essentially fixed size. The energy level of a
representative individual is p ∈ R+, the proportion of its time spent feeding is u ∈ [0, 1], the
amount of available resource (say the preys population size) is n ∈ R+. The dynamics are
as follows, with a, b and c positive coefficients:
p˙ = −ap+ bnu , (1)
n˙ = −cnu . (2)
It should be noticed that these dynamics leave the strictly positive othant invariant. We
may therefore exploit the following feature of these dynamics: The ratio x = p/n obeys the
scalar dynamics
x˙ = −ax+ (b + cx)u . (3)
The criterion for long term sustainability is the number of eggs layed during a season, of
length T , given as
J =
∫ T
0
(1− u(t))p(t) dt . (4)
This criterion is not expressible in terms of x only.
A small population of potential invaders will be considered, with the same energy dy-
namics
p˙m = −apm + bnum (5)
and criterion
Jm =
∫ T
0
(1− um)pm dt , (6)
but with no effect on the resource amount because of the negligible size of that population.
It gives rise to the variable xm = pm/n with dynamics
x˙m = −axm + bum + cxmu . (7)
INRIA
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2 Collective optimum
2.1 Euler Pontryagin equations
We use a standard maximum principle approach to finding the optimal collective behavior.
To take advantage of the reduced size dynamics, let V be the Bellman function of this
problem. We shall show that it has a solution of the form
V (t, n, p) = nU(t, x) .
If this is so,
∂V
∂t
= n
∂U
∂t
,
∂V
∂p
=
∂U
∂x
,
∂V
∂n
= U(t, x)− x∂U
∂x
.
The Hamilton Jacobi Caratheodory Bellman equation thus reads
n
∂U
∂t
+ max
u∈[0,1]
[
−∂U
∂x
(ap− bnu)−
(
U − x∂U
∂x
)
cnu+ (1 − u)p
]
= 0 .
Again, we may divide through by n to obtain
∂U
∂t
+ max
u∈[0,1]
[
−∂U
∂x
[ax− (b+ cx)u]− Ucu+ (1 − u)x
]
= 0 , (8)
with the terminal condition
∀x ∈ R+ , U(T, x) = 0 .
Introduce the notations
ν(t) =
∂U
∂t
(t, x(t)) , λ(t) =
∂U
∂x
(t, x(t)) .
The equations of the characteristics of this PDE, or the Euler-Pontryagin adjoint equations,
yield
ν˙ = cuν , ν(T ) = 0 ,
λ˙ = aλ− 1 + u , λ(T ) = 0 , (9)
with u ∈ argmaxu{[λ(b + cx) − x − cU ]u}. We further simplify this with the additional
notation µ = U − λx which is just ∂V/∂n. Using (9) and (8), we get
µ˙ = (cµ− bλ)u , µ(T ) = 0 , (10)
and that the optimal u is given by
u(t) ∈ argmaxu{σ(t)u} , (11)
σ = bλ− cµ− x . (12)
RR n° 7314
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2.2 Field of trajectories
2.2.1 The switch line
At t = T , σ(T ) = −x(T ) < 0. Therefore, the final optimal control is u = 0. The final part
of the optimal state and adjoint trajectories are thus
x(t) = x(T )ea(T−t) , λ(t) =
1
a
(
1− e−a(T−t)
)
, µ(t) = 0 ,
hence σ(t) = bλ(t)− x(t) vanishes on a switch line
x = bλ = (b/a)[1− e−a(T−t)] .
On this curve, the optimal control switches from 1 to 0.
A terminal trajectory with u = 0 can emanate from this switch line only if its slope is
larger than that of the switch line itself, i.e. if
−ax ≥ −be−a(T−t)
which, placed back in the equation of the switch line yields
x ≤ xˆ = b/(2a) and t ≥ tˆ = T − (ln 2)/a . (13)
Therefore, the switch line extends only from this (tˆ, xˆ) to x(T ) = 0. The last primary
trajectory, passing through x(tˆ) = xˆ has x(T ) = b/(4a). The trajectories with x(T ) > b/(4a)
have u = 0 as their optimal control for all t ≤ T .
2.2.2 Tributaries of the switch line
Trajectories with x(T ) < b/(4a) have a corner on the switch line. Prior to reaching it, they
have u = 1, hence
x˙ = (c− a)x+ b .
These trajectories, reffered to as the tributaries of the switch line, are as follows. Let ts,
xs = (b/a)[1− e−a(T−ts)] be their end point on the switch line. We get
x(t) =
(
xs +
b
c− a
)
e−(c−a)(ts−t) − b
c− a .
We show in the appendix that indeed, σ does not change sign on these trajectories. They
have x(·) increasing with time. As a matter of fact, we have x˙ > 0 if c ≥ a or, if c < a and
x ≤ b/(a− c). But since on the switch line, x ≤ b/(2a) < b/(a− c), this is always satisfied.
Hence all such trajectories come from the time axis. However, it is easy to check that, if
T >
1
a
ln 2 +
1
c− a ln
c+ a
2a
,
the trajectory ending at x(tˆ) = xˆ comes from x(t) = 0 for a positive t, and all other, which
have a smaller x(t), a fortiori. Hence in that case none of the trajectories described so far
accounts for an initial condition x(0) ≤ (b/4a)eaT .
INRIA
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2.2.3 Singular line and tributaries
The space between the primary trajectory x(t) = b/(4a) exp[a(T − t)] and the tributary
x(t) = b
(
1
2a
+
1
c− a
)
e−(c−a)(ts−tˆ) − b
c− a
is not accounted for so far. In that space, we construct a singular line ending at (tˆ, xˆ). We
differentiate twice the expression for σ (22), using (3),(9),(10):
σ˙ = cσ + abλ+ ax− b ,
σ¨ = cσ˙ + a[(2b+ cx)u + abλ− b− ax] .
Using σ = 0 and hence σ˙ = abλ+ ax− b = 0, we get
1
a
σ¨ = (2b+ cx)u − 2ax .
Hence, a singular control is
u =
2ax
2b+ cx
. (14)
With this control,
x˙ =
acx2
b+ 2cx
> 0 .
Hence in particular x(t) < xˆ = b/(2a). And towards the negative times, the asymptote is
x = 0. More precisely, the singular arc satisfies
ln
xˆ
x
+
2b
c
(
1
xˆ
− 1
x
)
= a(tˆ− t) ,
which can be solved for x in terms of t with the help of the Lambert function W as
x =
2b
c
[
W0
(
2a
c
ea(T−t)+4a/c
)]−1
,
a perfectly useless formula . . .
We check that (14) yields u ≤ 1. This is true if (2a − c)x ≤ 2b. This is always true if
2a ≤ c, and, if 2a > c provided that x ≤ b/(2a− c). But we have seen that on the singular
arc, x < b/(2a) < b/(2a− c). Hence the conditionn is always satisfied.
Substituting (14) into (9) and (10), and using (13), one obtains
λ˙ = −1
b
x˙ , λ =
1
a
− x
b
,
µ˙ = −2
c
x˙ , µ =
b
ac
− 2x
c
.
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Now, tributaries can reach this singular arc at any of its points with either u = 1, coming
from “under” the singular arc, or with u = 0 coming from “above”. Let (ts, xs) be a point
where a tributary reaches this singular line. The tributary with u = 0 satisfy
x = ea(t
s
−t)xs ,
λ =
1
a
− x
s
b
e−a(t
s
−t) ,
µ =
1
c
(
b
a
− 2xs
)
,
and hence
σ = 2xs(1− ch[a(ts − t)]) ≤ 0 .
Therefore, the optimal control remains u = 0 all along. The analysis of the tributaries with
u = 1 is done in the appendix together with those of the switch line.
3 Uninvadable strategy
3.1 “Optimal” strategy can be invaded
We consider a very small sub-population of mutating individuals behaving differently. Let a
subscript m stand for variables concerning that population, with xm = pm/n. It is so small
that it has no effect on resource depletion. Its dynamics are given by (5) and (7), while the
dynamics (1) and (2) are unchanged, and therefore also (3). Its fitness is measured by the
criterion (6).
Let us consider u = φ(t, x) given, and um as a control seeking to maximize Jm. The same
construction as above leads to the Value function Vm(pm, n)Um(t, xm), with the Hamilton
Jacobi equation
∂Um
∂t
− ∂Um
∂xm
(axm − bum + cxmu)− Umcu+ (1− um)xm = 0 . (15)
It should be pointed out that this equation holds true with Vm = nUm(t, xm) the fitness
obtained by the mutant, even if it does not “optimize”. Using the notations
νm =
∂Um
∂t
, λm =
∂Um
∂xm
, µm = Um − λmxm ,
its characteristics are
ν˙m = cuνm , νm(T ) = 0 ,
λ˙m = aλm − 1 + um , λm(T ) = 0 ,
µ˙m = cµmu− bλmum .
(16)
Differentiating with respect to um, we find that
DJm.vm =
∫ T
0
σm(t)vm(t) dt .
INRIA
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with
σm = bλm − xm . (17)
If the mutant behaves as the resident population, the variables indexedm are equal to the
corresponding variables without the index. On the singular arc, this leads to σm = σ + cµ.
We also have, on this arc, using σ = bλ− cµ− x = 0,
µ˙ = (cµ− bλ)u = − 2ax
2
2b+ cx
< 0 .
Since µ(tˆ) = 0, it follows that for t < tˆ, µ(t) > 0, hence σm > 0, which means that the
mutant can improve its fitness by choosing um = 1. Hence a mutant may appear that will
be more fit than the resident population: an invasion.
This is not surprising: the singular arc corresponds to a time interval during which the
resident population cooperates to spare some resource. The mutant, who does not deplete
that resource, has no incentive to spare it and can use as much as it wants. We defer to
a future paper the analysis of the optimum behaviour of the mutant in this cooperating
“optimum” population.
3.2 An uninvadable strategy
Since the “optimal” strategy can be invaded by a mutant, there is a priori no reason for this
strategy to survive on the long-run. Therefore, we seek a strategy for the resident population
that could not be invaded. For that purpose, we seek a control law u = φ(x, t) such that
the optimum mutant strategy will be
um = u . (18)
Therefore, there will be no possibility for a mutant to be more fit than the resident. This
will lead to a new type of singular arc.
Close to final time, we have σm = 0, therefore the optimal behaviour of the mutant is
um = 0. We choose u = 0 to insure the equality (18). We obtain the same field as previously,
from the switch line on, up to time T .
We attempt to construct a singular line for the mutant, attaching to (tˆ, xˆ), and satisfaying
(18). This means that the dynamics of both the state and the adjoints are as in the previous
analysis, because of (18), but σm is as in (17). Differentiating along the singular arc, we get
σ˙m = baλ− b+ ax− cxu
hence, σm = 0 translates into
u =
ax+ abλ− b
cx
=
2ax− b
cx
=: uσ(x) . . (19)
The second form above is obtained using σm = 0. Interestingly, the first differentiation of
σm yields a definite expression for u, contrary to what is observed in classical singular arcs.
RR n° 7314
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The reason is that this u is not the optimizing one, say um, but the control of the resident
population. However, we wish that both be equal. This also leads to xm = x. Yet, the
formula (19) should not be considered a feedback
u =
2axm − b
cxm
which would cause xm, and therefore um, to influence the mutant’s dynamics, resulting in
a different set of adjoint equations. The resident’s control and state histories should be
considered as fixed a priori, independant of the mutant’s action. They are just chosen in
such a way that the optimal mutant’s variables coincide with them.
Substituting uσ (19) in the dynamics, this yields
x˙ =
1
cx
[acx2 + b(2a− c)x− b2] .
It is easy to see that under these dynamics, as t→ −∞, x(t)→ x¯ with
x¯ =
b
2ac
[
−2a+ c+
√
4a2 + c2
]
.
Notice also that the formula for u in (19) is increasing in x, as is easily seen. Moreover,
on the singular arc, x ∈ [xˆ, x¯], thus on the one hand, u ≥ uσ(xˆ) = 0, and on the other hand
after a straightforward calculation:
u ≤ uσ(x¯) = 1
2
−
√
4a2 + c2 − 2a
2c
<
1
2
.
Hence this is a feasible control.
The tributaries of this singular arc are investigated together with those of the cooperative
case in the appendix.
It is worth mentioning that, at the final point (tˆ, xˆ) of this new singular arc, we have for
the singular control u = 0. Hence the singular arc has the same slope as the switch line,
(and as the primary tangent to it). The singular arc and the switch line form together a
“smooth” curve. Such a feature is known to be the rule in zero-sum two-person differential
games. The next section explains why.
4 Further remarks
4.1 A zero-sum game formulation of Wardrop equilibria
Let a “resident” population “chooses” its behaviour, or strategy, u in some strategy space
U , while a potential mutant —or cheater, or free-rider— would use a strategy um ∈ U . Let
J(u, um) and Jm(u, um) be the fitness of the resident and mutant population respectively
INRIA
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Figure 1: The field of trajectories of the ESS. Green solid line: the singular arc. Dotted
green line: the singular arc of the cooperative solution.
under this scenario. By hypothesis, if the “mutant” behaves as the resident, there is no
difference between them in terms of fitness, hence
J(u, u) = Jm(u, u) . (20)
A strategy u⋆ ∈ U is said to be uninvadable, or be a Wardrop equilibrium [17], if a Â mutant
cannot do better than a resident population using that strategy, i.e. if
∀um ∈ U , Jm(u⋆, um) ≤ J(u⋆, um) .
Let
∆J(u, v) = Jm(u, v)− J(u, v) . (21)
Equivalently, the uninvadability property can be stated as
sup
um∈U
∆J(u⋆, um) ≤ 0 .
However, it follows from (20) that ∆J(u⋆, u⋆) = 0, so that the supremum above is always
non-negative. Hence, a strategy u∗ is uninvadable, or a Wardrop equilibrium, if and only if
max
um∈U
∆J(u⋆, um) = ∆J(u
⋆, u⋆) = 0 .
And since this supremum is always non-negative, it follows that there exists a Wardrop
equilibrium if and only if
min
u∈U
sup
um∈U
∆J(u, um) = 0 .
RR n° 7314
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Therefore, the search for a Wardrop equilibrium can be performed as follows : solve the
zero-sum two-person game minumaxum ∆J(u, um), and if the min exists, check whether the
min-sup reached yields a Value zero. If yes, the minimizing u is a Wardrop equilibrium. If
furthermore the maximum in um is unique, then this is also an evolutionary stable strategy,
or ESS [11, 10]. This is the case in the above problem.
4.2 Homogeneous problems
The following piece of theory can undoubtly be deduced from Noether’s theorem [14]. We
offer a simple direct derivation. It accounts for the transformation we used via the intro-
duction of the variable x.
4.2.1 The problem
Let a control problem be given by a state y ∈ Rn, a control u ∈ U, dynamics
y˙ = f(y, u), y(0) = y0,
with all regularity and growth assumptions to guarantee existence of the solution for all
measurable control functions u(·) ∈ M(R+ → U).
A terminal condition T (y) = 0, T (·) ∈ C1(Rn), meaning that t1 = inf{t | T (y(t)) = 0},
and for simplicity we assume that all feasible trajectories are transverse to that differentiable
manifold. A criterion to be minimized by the control action is given, of the form
J(y0, u(·)) = K(y(t1)) +
∫ t1
0
L(y(t), u(t)) dt .
Assumptions
1. The functions f , T , K and L are homogeneous of degree one in y.
2. The state variable yn remains strictly positive for all control functions.
It follows from these assumptions that if φ stands for f , T , K or L, and if y(n−1) stands for
the first n− 1 components of y, there exists a function of n− 1 variables noted φ˜ such that
φ(y) = ynφ˜
(
1
yn
y(n−1)
)
Let also x = (1/yn)y(n−1). Then, we claim
Theorem
1. The reduced state x(·) obeys the dynamics
x˙ = g˜(x, u) = f˜n−1(x, u)− xf˜n(x, u) ,
INRIA
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2. The Value function V (y) of this problem is homogeneous :
V (y) = ynU
(
1
yn
y(n−1)
)
3. The function U solves the Hamilton Jacobi equation of the problem
J˜(x0) = yn(T )K˜(y(T )) +
∫ t1
0
yn(t)L˜(x(t), u(t)) dt .
where
yn(t) := yn(0) exp
(∫ t
0
f˜n(x(s), u(s)) ds
)
.
4.2.2 Proof of the theorem
Dynamics Direct calculations result in
x˙i =
1
yn
fi(y, u)− yi
y2n
fn(y, u) = g˜i(x, u) .
Value function It is completely elementary to see that if the data are globally homo-
geneous of degree one in x, so is the Value function. Therefore, there exists U such that
V (x) = xnU((1/xn)x
n−1.
Hamilton Jacobi equation Easy calculations yield
∂V
∂yi
(y) =
∂U
∂xi
(x), i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
and
∂V
∂yn
(y) = U(x)−
n−1∑
i=1
xi
∂U
∂xi
(x).
Substitute these in the standard Hamilton Jacobi equation
max
u
[
∂V
∂y
f(y, u) + L(y, u)
]
= 0 ,
to get (with x := (1/yn)y(n−1))
max
u
[
∂U
∂x
(x)fn−1(y, u) + fn(y, u)
(
U(x) − ∂U
∂x
(x)x
)
+ L(y, u)
]
= 0 .
If yn 6= 0, we may write this as
max
u
yn
[
f˜n(x, u)U(x) +
∂U
∂x
(x)g˜(x, u) + L˜(x, u)
]
= 0 .
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If furthermore yn(t) > 0, then we may divide through by yn without changing the max
operator. We recognize the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation of the problem with an
exponential discount factor exp
∫
f˜n(x, u). However, multiplied by the positive constant
yn(0), this exponential is indeed yn(t).
The terminal condition T (y) = 0 translates into T˜ (x) = 0, and the boundary condition
of the H.J.B. equation into ∀x : T˜ (x) = 0, U(x) = K˜(x).
4.3 Mixed strategy vs mixed population
We want to investigate here the possible meanings of the mixed, singular strategy. Recall
that in our model, u = 0 means reproducing, while u = 1 means feeding. What is the
meaning of an intermediary strategy u ∈ (0, 1) ?
One possible interpretation is that each individual in the population spends some time
eating and some time reproducing in a fast cycle, as compared to the horizon of the problem
—here a year— and to the characteristic frequency of the dynamics, here a and c. This thus
a monomorphic population agreeing on a mixed strategy for all individuals.
In linear problems, it is possible to think of an intermediary u˜ as representing a poly-
morphic population, where a fraction u˜ uses the strategy u = 1 while a fraction 1 − u˜ uses
the strategy u = 0. However, our criterion here is nonlinear. Therefore further investigation
is needed.
Let the population be represented by a measured space Ω, with a positive measure µ
of total mass µ(Ω) = 1. (It is thus a probability measure.) Each individual is represented
as an ω ∈ Ω. Assume also that each individual ω has to pick, at each instant of time, a
control v(ω, t) ∈ {0, 1}. We need to assume that ω 7→ v(ω, t) is µ-measurable for (allmost)
all t ∈ [0, T ], and that, for (allmost) all ω ∈ Ω, t 7→ v(ω, t) is piecewise constant, equal to 0
or 1 on time intervals (hence Lebesgue measurable).
Each individual has an energy pi(ω, t) at time t. Its dynamics are
p˙i(ω, t) = −api(ω, t) + bn(t)v(ω, t) .
The rsource depletion rate is
n˙ = −cn
∫
Ω
v(ω, t) dµ(ω) .
So, if we set
u(t) =
∫
Ω
v(ω, t) dµ(ω) = µ({ω | v(ω, t) = 1})
and
p(t) =
∫
Ω
pi(ω, t) dµ(ω) ,
we find equations (1) and (2), as it should.
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The number of offspring produced by an individual is
f(ω) =
∫ T
0
(1− v(ω, t))pi(ω, t) dt ,
and for the whole population (using Fubini’s theorem)
F =
∫
Ω
f(ω) dµ(ω) =
∫ T
0
[∫
Ω
(1− v(ω, t))pi(ω, t) dµ(ω)
]
dt
which would coincide with the formula (4) for J only if pi(ω, t) and v(ω, t) were proba-
bilistically independant, an impossible situation if each player uses a constant control on
nonzero, measurable, time intervals. We would approach such an independance if we were
to assume that the time intervals during which the individuals’controls are constant are
extremely short, and after each, the set of individuals using u = 1, say, is drawn at random,
with probability u(t), independantly of pi(ω, t). But this is reconstructing a monomorphic
population of mixed players.
A Switch function on feeding tributaries
A.1 All tributaries with u = 1
Let ts, xs, λs, µs stand for the variables t, x, λ and µ at the point where a trajectory with
u = 1 meets either the switch line or a singular arc, either cooperative or uninvadable. To
simplify the notations, let also
α := e−a(ts−t) , γ := e−c(ts−t) .
On this trajectory, we have
x(t) =
(
xs +
b
c− a
)
α− b
c− a ,
λ(t) = λsα ,
µ(t) = µsγ +
b
c− a(α − γ)
We want to investigate the sign of
σ = bλ− cµ− x ,
remembering that in all cases to be investigated, σ(ts) = 0. We have already noticed that
σ˙ = cσ + abλ+ ax− b .
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Hence
σ = −
∫ ts
t
e−c(τ−t)(abλ(τ) + ax(τ) − b) dτ . (22)
We wish to show that L(τ) := abλ(τ) + ax(τ) − b < 0, thus proving that σ is positive from
t = 0 to ts. Substituting the explicit values of x, λ and µ, we get
L(t) = a
[
bλsα+ xs
γ
α
+
b
c− a
(γ
α
− c
a
)]
A.2 Tributaries of the switch line
On the switch line, xs = bλs and µs = 0. Hence
L = ab
[
λs
(
α+
γ
α
)
+
1
c− a
(γ
α
− c
a
)]
We notice that L(ts) = ab(2λs − 1/a). But we know that on the switch line λs ≤ 1/2a.
Hence L(ts) ≤ 0. Let us investigate its time derivative:
1
ab
L˙(t) = λs
(
aα+ (c− a)γ
α
)
+
γ
α
= aλsα+ ((c− a)λs + 1) γ
α
.
Hence 1ab L˙ > (−aλs + 1)γ/α > 0, and therefore, L(t) ≤ 0 for allt t ≤ ts.
A.3 Tributaries of the singular arcs
We now have
L(ts) = a(bλs + xs)− b .
We claim that xs < b/a. As a matter of fact, on the singular arc of the cooperative solution,
xs ≤ b/2a. On the singular arc of the uninvadable solution,
xs ≤ x¯ = b
2a
[
1 +
√
4a2 + c2 − 2a
c
]
.
It is easy to chack that
√
4a2 + c2 − 2a < c, so that indeed, xs < b/a, and therefore,
L(ts) < 0. Again, compute its time derivative:
L˙(t) = a
[
abλsα+ ((c− a)xs + b) γ
α
]
> 0
again thanks to b− axs > 0. So, again, we may conclude that for all t ≤ ts, L(t) < 0.
In all three cases, we conclude with the help of formula (22) that on these trajectories,
for all t ≤ ts, σ(t) > 0.
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